The necessity of discretion: A behavioral evaluation of bottom-up implementation theory by Thomann, E et al.
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Public Management Research Association.  
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly 
cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com
1
Journal of Public Administration Research And Theory, 2018, 1–19
doi:10.1093/jopart/muy024
Article
Article
The Necessity of Discretion: 
A Behavioral Evaluation of Bottom-Up 
Implementation Theory
Eva Thomann*, Nadine van Engen†, Lars Tummers‡ 
*Department of Politics, University of Exeter; †Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam;  
‡Utrecht University Utrecht School of Governance
Address correspondence to the author at vanengen@essb.eur.nl
Abstract
The topic of discretion continues to be hotly debated in policy design and policy implementation. 
In top-down theories, discretion at the frontline is often seen as a control problem: discretion 
should be avoided as it can mean that the policy is not implemented as intended. Conversely, 
bottom-up theories state that discretion can help policy implementers tailor a policy to specific 
circumstances. However, there has been little systematic research into how the experience of hav-
ing discretion motivates frontline workers to implement a policy. We conceptualize and evalu-
ate this relationship by combining public administration and motivation literature, using datasets 
in healthcare and education and large-N set-theoretic configurational analysis. Results robustly 
show that experiencing discretion is a quasi-necessary condition and, hence, a prerequisite for 
high implementation willingness. This finding is more in line with bottom-up than with top-down 
theories. Policy implementers crucially need the freedom to adapt the program to local conditions 
for being motivated to implement a policy. The evidence encourages scholars and practitioners to 
move from the question whether frontline workers should be granted discretion to how to best 
make use of frontline workers’ discretion instead.
Introduction
“The closer one is to the source of the problem, 
the greater is one’s ability to influence it; and 
the problem-solving ability of complex systems 
depends not on hierarchical control but on maxi-
mizing discretion at the point where the problem 
is most immediate.”
Richard F. Elmore (1979: 605)
Discretion is the freedom to decide what should be 
done in a particular situation. Repeatedly, research 
has shown that frontline workers—also referred to as 
public professionals or street-level bureaucrats—have 
an important role in the successful implementation of 
policies as they inevitably retain some degree of discre-
tion (Barnes and Henly 2018; Davis 1969; Gofen 2013; 
Hupe and Hill 2007; Lipsky 1980/2010; Maynard-
Moody and Musheno 2012). However, the implemen-
tation theory has always held contradictory views on 
the exact role of discretion (Thomann et al. 2016). Top-
down perspectives treat deviations from the policy-on-
paper as a control problem: room for interpretation 
makes it increasingly likely that policy means and ends 
will be mismatched (Howlett 2004: 5). Conversely, bot-
tom-up perspectives put frontline workers’ discretion 
at the center stage of policy implementation (Lipsky 
1980/2010; Sabatier 1986). As the above quotation 
by Elmore illustrates, from this perspective, frontline 
workers are seen as de facto policy makers. Discretion 
helps them to tailor a policy to specific circumstances.
Although research has moved on to hybrid, integra-
tive frameworks, the discussion surrounding discretion 
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at the frontline never lost its practical salience for 
policy design and implementation (Howlett 2004; 
Hupe 2013; Hupe and Hill 2007). Scholars continue 
to discuss the reasons why frontline workers use their 
discretion in more or less beneficial ways for clients 
and public goals (e.g., Brodkin 2011; Keiser 1999; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2012; Thomann 
2015). However, little attention has been paid to the 
implicitly assumed link between frontline workers’ dis-
cretion and the motivation to implement government 
policies. This is surprising, given that “research per-
formed in ignorance of the understanding that imple-
menting actors have about their circumstances is likely 
to miss important parts of the explanation” (O’Toole 
2000: 269).
To explore the motivational effects of discretion, 
this article draws on the logic of the seminal Thomas 
theorem: “If men define situations as real, they are 
real in their consequences.” (Thomas 1928:  572, see 
also Lewin 1936). We focus on the perceived degree 
of discretion, instead of the objective degree of discre-
tion, and investigate to what extent frontline work-
ers experience discretion. We operationalize perceived 
discretion via the concept of powerfulness as devel-
oped in the policy alienation literature (Loyens 2015; 
Thomann 2015; Tummers 2011; Van Engen et  al. 
2016; Van der Voet et al. 2017). Hence, powerfulness 
is seen as discretion-as-perceived by frontline work-
ers. We define powerfulness more formally as frontline 
workers’ perceived influence on decisions concerning 
the policy. The research question of this article is then: 
How does powerfulness motivate frontline workers to 
implement policies?
Psychologists suggest a positive link between 
powerfulness and motivation (Gagné and Deci 2005). 
However, scholars studying policy implementation 
have not found a strong, consistent relation between 
powerfulness and implementation willingness (Loyens 
2015; Thomann 2015; Tummers 2011; Van Engen 
et al. 2016). Contrary to these previous studies, we rely 
on an asymmetric explanation of policy implementers’ 
motivation: the things that motivate people may be 
different from those that demotivate them (Herzberg 
et  al. 1959; Matzler and Renzl 2007). Accordingly, 
we study two interpretations of the motivational role 
of powerfulness. The first interpretation argues that 
powerfulness is quasi-necessary, although on its own 
not sufficient to motivate employees (Goertz and Starr 
2003; Herzberg et al. 1959; Lammers et al. 2016). The 
second interpretation is that powerfulness is only moti-
vating when the public policy is consistent with the 
frontline workers’ values (Dias and Maynard-Moody 
2007; Grant and Berry 2011; May et al. 2004).
We study these interpretations using two large sam-
ples. By doing so, this study makes two contributions 
to the literature. It adds to theory by clarifying a core 
aspect of the top-down versus bottom-up debate: is 
discretion beneficial for policy implementation? It 
does so by connecting the policy implementation lit-
erature with the motivation theory from Herzberg. 
Methodologically, it uses state-of-the-art tools specifi-
cally designed for capturing the hypothesized asym-
metric patterns: large-N set-theoretic configurational 
comparative analysis using fuzzy sets, combined with 
formal theory evaluation, measures of uncertainty, 
and systematic robustness tests (Misangyi et al. 2017; 
Ragin 2000; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).
In the next section, we will introduce our theoretical 
framework and the hypotheses. We then introduce our 
methods, the research design, and the data collected 
among 1,004 healthcare workers and 1,087 second-
ary school teachers in the Netherlands. After pre-
senting the results, we conclude and discuss how our 
results can inform public administration scholars and 
practitioners.
Theoretical Framework
The concept of discretion often serves as an umbrella 
term for different aspects of bureaucratic practice. In 
policy implementation research specifically, discretion 
concerns the extent of freedom that frontline workers 
have to choose among possible courses of behavior 
when implementing policies (Davis 1969; Hupe 2013). 
Top-down approaches emphasize the degree of free-
dom granted by a rule maker to an implementing actor 
(“discretion-as-granted”; Howlett 2004). Contrary to 
this, bottom-up approaches presuppose an inevitable 
existence of discretion and analyze how the degree of 
freedom is actually used by frontline workers (“discre-
tion-as-used”; Hupe 2013).
Next to discretion-as-granted and discretion-as-used, 
there is also a key role for discretion-as-perceived: the 
degree to which frontline workers perceive to possess 
discretion. According to the “Thomas theorem”, peo-
ple often feel and behave based on their perceptions of 
reality, not on the basis of reality itself (Thomas 1928). 
This perspective highlights the importance of policy-
related attitudes for frontline policy implementation 
(Ewalt and Jennings 2004). The Thomas theorem sug-
gests that discretion-as-used (Hupe 2013) presupposes 
discretion-as-perceived. Frontline workers should feel 
that they have discretion before they can actually use 
it. For instance, a social worker should feel that she can 
grant an exception to a rule before actually doing this. 
Street-level bureaucracy scholars have recently begun 
to explore “discretion-as-perceived” under the head-
ing of “policy powerfulness”, meaning the perceived 
degree of influence that frontline workers have over 
shaping a policy during its design and implementation 
(Tummers et al. 2009). This power may be exercised at 
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the strategic, tactical, or operational level. High policy 
powerfulness thus indicates perceived discretion; the 
absence of powerfulness (i.e., powerlessness) indicates 
a lack of perceived discretion.
We can then connect discretion-as-perceived—here 
conceptualized as policy powerfulness—to implemen-
tation willingness. To actually achieve policy goals, 
frontline workers should be willing to implement the 
policy (Ewalt and Jennings 2004; Van der Voet et al. 
2017). High willingness to implement means that 
frontline workers intend to put effort in executing the 
policy. Bottom-up theories assume that discretion is 
positively linked with successful implementation. Note, 
however, that what exactly success entails might differ 
from a bottom-up or top-down view. “Conformance 
implementation” refers to the degree to which the cen-
trally decided blueprint is implemented from top to 
down (implementation success). From the bottom-up, 
“performance implementation” means that a policy 
achieves outcomes that resolve the policy problem 
at stake (policy success; Barrett and Fudge 1981). 
Arguably, implementation willingness matters for both 
conformance and performance implementation.
The positive link between discretion and implemen-
tation willingness assumes that policy powerfulness 
can have a motivational effect on frontline workers. 
Scholars agree that perceptions can, and often do, 
influence behavior (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). 
Experiencing powerfulness is one of the main factors 
stimulating employees’ willingness to support a change 
(Greenwood et  al. 2002). Related to this, the policy 
alienation framework asserts that, as frontline work-
ers’ policy powerfulness increases, their support for a 
policy can increase as well (Tummers et al. 2009). This 
powerfulness can be experienced at either the national 
(strategic), organizational (tactical), and client (opera-
tional) level, or a combination of these. For instance, if 
a frontline worker has the impression that she—or her 
colleagues or representatives of a professional organi-
zation—is able to influence the content of policies at 
the national level, she is more likely to be motivated 
to implement the policy (Tummers et al. 2009). This is 
because it is more likely, then, that frontline workers’ 
interests and concerns are reflected in the content of 
the policy.
Next to powerfulness, policy alienation has a mean-
ingfulness dimension. Meaningfulness concerns the 
perception of the frontline worker that the policy is 
valuable for society in general (societal meaningful-
ness) and for the direct clients of the frontline worker 
(client meaningfulness). Contrary to expectation, in 
empirical tests, the relation between powerfulness 
and implementation willingness repeatedly appears 
either as weaker than between meaningfulness and 
implementation willingness (Van Engen et  al. 2016), 
as ambiguous (Loyens 2015; Thomann 2015), or as 
nonsignificant (Tummers 2011).
In light of these puzzling empirical findings, we 
suggest two alternative interpretations of the motiva-
tional link of powerfulness on implementation willing-
ness. Previous research has assumed symmetric effects, 
where the same change in implementation willingness 
is expected both when powerfulness is added and when 
it is taken away. Contrary to this, motivation theory as 
developed by among else Herzberg et al. (1959, see for 
recent discussions Bassett-Jones et  al. 2005; Matzler 
and Renzl 2007; Sachau 2007) suggests that the effects 
of particular motivational factors are asymmetric. It 
is a fundamental insight from the motivation theory 
(Herzberg et  al. 1959) that the things that motivate 
people are often different from the things that demoti-
vate them. For example, a low salary makes you dissat-
isfied. However, a high salary does not automatically 
make you satisfied. This means that the influence of 
policy powerfulness might work only, or mainly, in one 
direction. Thus, the change in implementation willing-
ness might not be of the same magnitude or direc-
tion when powerfulness is added as when it is taken 
away. To detect such patterns, an empirical method 
that models asymmetric effects is needed. This is why 
we choose a new, set-theoretic method that enables us 
to model asymmetric explanatory patterns (Misangyi 
et al. 2017).
Interpretation 1: Policy Powerfulness is a Necessary 
Condition
The first interpretation linking powerfulness and 
implementation willingness builds upon the idea that 
discretion is a prerequisite for policy success (Matland 
1995: 148). If this is the case, then frontline workers 
need to feel to be able to influence the policy to be will-
ing to implement that policy; they need to feel power-
ful. Hence, powerfulness is a necessary condition for 
implementation willingness.
Policy implementation literature, especially the 
studies rooted in the bottom-up perspective, suggests 
that an important factor in this willingness of frontline 
workers is the extent to which organizations are will-
ing and able to delegate decision-making authority to 
the frontline (Meier and O’Toole 2002; Tummers and 
Bekkers 2014). This influence may be particularly pro-
nounced in frontline workers whose expectations of 
discretion and autonomy contradict notions of bureau-
cratic control (Freidson 2001). As we study teachers 
and healthcare workers, this seems to be particularly 
important. Maynard-Moody and Portillo (2010: 
259)  note, “street-level workers rely on their discre-
tion to manage the physical and emotional demands 
of their jobs. They also rely on their discretion to claim 
some small successes and redeem some satisfaction.”
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The enabling role of powerfulness for implementa-
tion willingness can be traced back to the human rela-
tions movement (McGregor 1960). One of the central 
tenets of this movement is that employees have a right 
to give input into decisions that affect their working 
lives. Employees enjoy carrying out decisions they have 
helped create—as compared to decisions they have not 
helped create or were “forced upon them.” As such, the 
human relations movement argues that when employ-
ees experience discretion during their work, this will 
positively influence several job indicators, such as 
implementation willingness, loyalty or responsibil-
ity, by fulfilling intrinsic employee needs (for more 
detailed discussions, see for instance Yukl and Becker 
2012). This mechanism was already proposed by Follet 
(1924)—her work presaged the rise of the human rela-
tions movement—who underscored the importance 
of leaders having the capacity to increase the sense 
of power among those led. So that those led, in turn, 
would be empowered to achieve desired changes at the 
organizational, community, or policy level.
The above argumentation suggests that frontline 
workers need to feel powerful in order to be willing to 
implement the policy. However, feeling powerful alone 
may not be sufficient. Many other factors can influ-
ence the willingness of frontline workers to implement 
a particular policy. This can include resources available 
in the organization (for instance, is there enough man-
power available to make a policy work?) or the value 
of a policy for society and political processes within 
organizations (e.g., May and Winter 2009; O’Toole 
2000; Thomann 2015). Hence, frontline workers need 
to feel powerful, but feeling powerful is not enough. 
This asymmetric interpretation accounts for the fact 
that not all frontline workers will use their discretion 
to contribute to successful implementation. Contrary 
to a symmetric effect, we hence expect that discretion-
as-perceived has an enabling effect for motivating 
frontline workers (Goertz and Starr 2003).
Accordingly, we can derive the first hypothesis. In 
order to be motivated to implement a public policy, 
frontline workers need to perceive that they have the 
power to influence the shaping of a policy program 
(powerfulness). They should experience this powerful-
ness at least at either the strategic, tactical, or operational 
level in order to feel motivated for policy implementa-
tion (Van Engen et  al. 2016). Still, this powerfulness 
does not by definition result in high implementation 
willingness. Hence, frontline workers with high imple-
mentation willingness are a subset of those frontline 
workers who experience powerfulness. We hypothesize 
that policy powerfulness (either strategic: SP; tactical: 
TP or operational: OP) is a quasi-necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for high implementation willing-
ness (W). This is shown in Figure 1. To formalize this 
first hypothesis, the backward arrow “←” means “is 
necessary for” and “+” denotes the logical “OR”.
H1: SP + TP + OP ←W
Similarly, we expect that frontline workers who do 
not feel powerful are typically unwilling to implement 
government policies. As Figure  1 illustrates, if high 
implementation willingness requires the presence of 
powerfulness, then the frontline workers who do not 
feel powerful are a subset of those frontline workers 
with low implementation willingness. Since powerful-
ness is indicated by either strategic, tactical, or opera-
tional powerfulness (or a combination of these three), 
all three have to be absent to indicate the absence of 
powerfulness (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 82). 
Our second hypothesis thus states that the absence of 
the combination of strategic, tactical, and operational 
powerfulness is quasi-sufficient for low implemen-
tation willingness. The “*” sign denotes the logical 
“AND”, whereas the forward arrow “→” indicates “is 
sufficient for”. The tilde sign “~” denotes the absence 
of a factor:
H2: ~SP * ~TP * ~OP → ~W
Interpretation 2: Policy Powerfulness Interplays with 
Policy Meaningfulness
The second interpretation takes into account that 
frontline workers often feel a desire to benefit others 
with their work (Dias and Maynard-Moody 2007). 
They seek to help clients achieve long-term success and 
analyze the perceived added value of a policy for soci-
ety. Meaningfulness refers to workers’ perceptions of 
the contribution a policy makes to a greater purpose, 
such as societal goals (societal meaningfulness), and the 
added value of the policy for own clients (client mean-
ingfulness) (Tummers et al. 2009). For example, “client 
meaningfulness” is high when a teacher believes that 
the policy helps her students to improve their learning 
outcomes. Meaningful work is of critical importance 
for frontline workers (Grant and Berry 2011; May 
et al. 2004) and numerous studies have found a strong 
and positive correlation between meaningfulness and 
implementation willingness (Loyens 2015; Tummers 
2011; Van Engen et al. 2016; Van der Voet et al. 2017).
The bottom-up view acknowledges that policy 
changes arise from the interaction of policy and setting 
and should be consonant with the values of implement-
ing agents (Matland 1995). If frontline workers experi-
ence discretion, they can tailor the policy to the specific 
situation of the clients, thereby increasing their percep-
tion of its meaningfulness. The implementing actors’ 
perceptions, in turn, can be decisive for implementa-
tion outcomes. In summary, powerfulness adds to 
meaningfulness, which in turn fosters implementation 
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willingness (Lipsky 1980/2010; Matland 1995; 
Tummers and Bekkers 2014).
Hence, our third hypothesis expects that frontline 
workers who both feel powerful and perceive the pol-
icy as meaningful are willing to implement the policy. 
This hypothesis does not rule out that high implemen-
tation willingness can also result from other factors. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, it simply assumes that frontline 
workers who both feel powerful and find the policy 
meaningful are a subset of the frontline workers who 
are willing to implement the policy. The combination of 
policy powerfulness (strategic, tactical, or operational) 
with policy meaningfulness (societal meaningfulness: 
SM, or client meaningfulness: CM) is a quasi-sufficient 
condition for high implementation willingness:
H3: (SP + TP + OP) * (SM + CM) → W
It should be noted that these two interpretations are 
compatible: powerfulness can be quasi-necessary for 
implementation willingness (H1) and, in combination 
with meaningfulness, quasi-sufficient (H3). However, 
they are not identical: the first interpretation thinks 
of powerfulness as a prerequisite for implementa-
tion willingness (necessity), whereas the second one 
assumes that powerfulness in situations of meaningful-
ness typically results in high willingness to implement 
(sufficiency). They also represent two different vari-
ants of the bottom-up view on discretion-as-perceived. 
The first interpretation hypothesizes an enabling, but 
not automatically triggering role of powerfulness for 
frontline workers’ willingness to implement. The sec-
ond interpretation highlights the decisiveness of imple-
menting actors’ perceived meaningfulness of policies, 
and assumes that the degree of policy meaningfulness 
interacts with policy powerfulness to trigger imple-
mentation willingness. We may find that powerfulness 
enables, but does not always result in implementa-
tion willingness (interpretation 1 supported), whereas 
its combination with meaningfulness is not decisive 
for implementation willingness (interpretation two 
rejected)—or vice versa. Finally, we do not rule out 
that other factors than powerfulness and meaningful-
ness influence implementation willingness. Indeed, bot-
tom-up perspectives highlights various factors that can 
impact policy implementation. Furthermore, the effects 
of motivating factors can differ between individuals 
and situations. Our goal is to clarify the motivating 
role of powerfulness for, rather than comprehensively 
explain, implementation willingness.1 In addition, we 
identify the empirical relevance of powerfulness and 
meaningfulness for explaining implementation willing-
ness (Sachau 2007: 389).
Methods
Above, we have theorized the role of powerfulness 
for implementation willingness as an asymmetric and 
nonlinear effect. Although a variety of techniques can 
detect nonlinear effects (e.g., polynomials; see also 
Matzler and Renzl 2007), we use large-N set-theoretic 
configurational  comparative analysis (Ragin 1987, 
2000; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). We chose this 
method as it is the only available technique that mod-
els three central theoretical features of our framework 
(software: R packages QCA and SetMethods; Dusa 
2018; Medzihorsky et  al. 2016). First, set-theoretic 
configurational comparative methods are designed 
to assess subset relations like the ones hypothesized 
in Figure  1 in terms of necessity and sufficiency. 
Accordingly, high implementation willingness can 
have different explanations than low implementation 
willingness. Second, they also provide the possibility of 
equifinality, meaning that various scenarios can result 
in high or low implementation willingness: many (but 
not all) roads lead to Rome. This allows for motiva-
tions to differ between individuals. Third, conjunctural 
patterns are possible, capturing that case-specific fac-
tors affect implementation willingness in combination 
rather than in isolation (Schneider and Wagemann 
2012: 89, 295–305, 307–312). We need this possibil-
ity to evaluate our third hypothesis. Set-theoretic con-
figurational comparative techniques can be applied 
to a large-N setting (Fiss 2011). For theory-testing 
research designs like ours, large case numbers provide 
for a more robust test of the theory than small sam-
ples (Greckhamer et al. 2013; Thomann and Maggetti 
2017).
Given that this method is not widely used in pub-
lic administration, we shortly explain its rationale (for 
detailed descriptions, see Fiss 2011; Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012; Thomann and Maggetti 2017). The 
set-theoretic method applied focuses on configurations 
of variables as sets in which cases have membership 
or not. The attribution of cases to sets is called cali-
bration. Fuzzy sets allow us to account for differing 
degrees to which frontline workers’ perceptions are 
present. Qualitative anchors determine the stage at 
which the outcome or condition is deemed fully pre-
sent (fuzzy value 1), fully absent (fuzzy value 0), and 
1 As Fiss et  al. (2013: 195)  state: “in a traditional QCA, the notion of 
“controls” is usually not part of the analysis, as QCA does not consider 
isolating and estimating independent effects of causal variables as 
the central goal of analysis but instead focuses on combinations of 
causally relevant conditions (…) In contrast, incorporating solutions 
into a regression analysis would allow QCA researchers to examine 
whether the solutions identified also hold up when other relevant 
control variables are entered along with these solutions into a 
regression model”. We estimated alternative regression models, see 
Supplementary Appendix II. The results indicate that the relationship 
between powerfulness and implementation willingness is robust if 
control variables (age, education level, tenure) are included.
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an indifference (or crossover) point at 0.50. Contrary 
to usual measurement scales, the crossover point estab-
lishes the difference in kind. For example, fuzzy values 
in the set “high implementation willingness” above 
0.50 mean that implementation willingness is quite 
high (W), whereas values below 0.50 indicate that 
implementation willingness is quite low (~W).
We can think of necessary and sufficient conditions 
as subset relations. For example, our first hypothesis 
states that those frontline workers with high imple-
mentation willingness are a subset of those frontline 
workers who feel powerful. Large-N applications inte-
grate probabilistic elements to capture the degree to 
which a majority of cases correspond to the statement 
that X is a superset of Y (quasi-necessity; X ≥ Y), or a 
subset of Y (quasi-sufficiency; X ≤ Y) (Ragin 2000). 
The analysis of necessity starts with identifying sim-
ple conditions that are a superset of (that is: necessary 
for) the outcome (here: high implementation willing-
ness). If no simple condition proves necessary, further 
simple conditions can be added disjunctively until 
necessity is obtained (Thiem 2014). We interpret those 
supersets as necessary conditions that make theoreti-
cal sense against the background of our hypotheses, 
and meet the criteria outlined below (cf. Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012).
For the analysis of sufficiency, a “truth table” is con-
structed. The rows of the truth table indicate all possible 
combinations. This enables us to attribute the cases 
accordingly to the truth table and identify empirically 
unobserved configurations (so-called logical remain-
ders). If all or enough cases’ fuzzy set-membership in 
a truth table row is smaller than or equal to its mem-
bership in the outcome, then the row is identified as a 
sufficient configuration for the outcome. For example, 
if those frontline workers who partly or fully feel stra-
tegically, tactically, and operationally powerful and 
think the policy makes sense for clients and for society 
are also rather or fully willing to implement the policy, 
then this configuration of attitudes is sufficient for high 
implementation willingness. The logical minimization 
process then identifies the shortest possible expression 
depicting the configurations that imply the outcome—
the solution term. This is a straightforward procedure 
that relies on a basic set theory: for example, A*B*C + 
A*B*~C can be reduced to A*B (Thomann et al. 2018).
To evaluate our results, we use consistency and 
coverage measures. The values of these fit indices can 
range from 0 (low) to 1 (high). Consistency is the extent 
to which the results are in line with the statements of 
necessity or sufficiency. For sufficient conditions, con-
sistency is indicated for single truth table rows (raw con-
sistency), for single configurations of, or for the whole 
solution term. Furthermore, the proportional reduction 
in inconsistency (PRI) indicates the degree to which a 
given configuration is not simultaneously sufficient for 
both the occurrence and the nonoccurrence of the out-
come. Coverage sufficiency depicts how well the model 
explains the available empirical information. Raw cov-
erage expresses how much a single configuration covers, 
and unique coverage indicates how much it uniquely 
covers. Low coverage means that the model has a lim-
ited capacity to explain the outcome. For necessary con-
ditions, coverage expresses their relevance in terms of 
the condition set not being much larger than the out-
come set, and the relevance of necessity (RoN) in terms 
of the condition being close to a constant (all formulae 
in Schneider and Wagemann 2012:128, 139, 235–239).
Error management is a salient issue for large-N appli-
cations of set-theoretic configurational comparative 
methods (Maggetti and Levi-Faur 2013: 108; Thomann 
and Maggetti 2017). In the absence of established guide-
lines, we propose state-of-the-art strategies that comple-
ment the traditional parameters of fit to address possible 
Powerfulness
High 
implementation 
willingness
Low 
implementation 
willingness Powerlessness
Frontline worker’s perception
NecessarySufficient
Outcome
Meaningfulness
H 1
H 3
H 2
Figure 1.  Hypotheses.
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Table 1. Strategies to Address Errors and Evaluate Models
Issue Definition Strategy Application
Possible error 
sources
Deviant 
case and 
measurement 
errors
Errors related to sensitivity to 
one or more flawed cases
Frequency thresholds
robustness test
Use of three different frequency 
thresholds; configurations 
without a certain frequency 
are treated as logical 
remainders
Sensitivity to changes in raw 
consistency levels
Raw consistency
robustness test
Use of three different raw 
consistency thresholds 
(criterion: PRI)
Plausibility and 
tenability
Limited diversity and 
contradictions can 
trigger inferences that 
are implausible and/or 
contradictory
Enhanced standard 
analysis
Intermediate solution, based on 
directional expectations and 
exclusion of contradictory 
rows and untenable 
assumptions
Criteria for 
model 
evaluation
Accuracy Degree to which observations 
correspond to set relation
Consistency Necessity: ≥ 0.9
Sufficiency: ≥0.75
Simultaneous subset relations: 
degree to which the 
same condition is not 
simultaneously sufficient 
for the negated outcome
Proportional reduction 
in inconsistency (PRI)
No fixed threshold
Explanatory 
power
Empirical relevance of model Coverage and relevance 
of necessity
Necessity: ≥ 0.6
RoN ≥ 0.6 (direct calibration) / 
0.55 (recoding method)
Sufficiency: verbal interpretation
Low coverage indicates low 
explanatory power
Random errors Errors that are unpredictable 
and inconsistent in their 
magnitude or direction 
(e.g., because of estimation 
and personal factors in 
surveys)
Probabilistic criteria Right-handed Z-test for 
proportion of cases with 
X ≥ X (necessity)/ X ≤ Y 
(sufficiency)
0.8: “almost always”
Limited 
empirical 
diversity
Presence of logical 
remainders, that is, truth 
table rows without enough 
cases with membership 
>0.5
Limited diversity index
% remainders / logically 
possible configurations
Models with less limited 
diversity
have a stronger empirical basis
Ambiguity Patterns in data are 
unclear: several equally 
nonredundant solutions 
can be derived
Ambiguity index
(Nr. of equally plausible 
models)
Unambiguous models are 
preferred (row dominance 
applied)
Robustness Terms of enhanced 
parsimonious solution 
remain robust across 
different models that pass 
consistency threshold 0.75
Robustness index
Average % of models in 
which (a subset of) a 
term appears
More robust models are 
preferred
Skewness Skewed distributions can 
produce simultaneous 
subset relations, exacerbate 
limited diversity, and 
strongly distort parameters 
of fit
Skewness statistics % of cases with membership 
>0.5 in sets is reported
Skewness is problematic if the 
vast majority (>85%) of the 
cases cluster in only one of 
the four possible intersecting 
areas of the XY plots with 
two diagonals
Based on Baumgartner and Thiem (2017), Fiss (2011), Maggetti and Levi-Faur (2013), Ragin (2000), Schneider and Wagemann (2012), 
Skaaning (2011), Thomann and Maggetti (2017).
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error sources, as shown in Table 1. To account for differ-
ent possible model specifications and to assess robust-
ness, we calculated 54 models, using two calibration 
techniques (see below) and three different raw consist-
ency and frequency thresholds. The models presented in 
the paper rank best on eight criteria for model evalua-
tion, see Table 1. The rationale underlying the choice of 
different analytic thresholds and the “best” models for 
interpretation is outlined in detail in Box 1.
We assess hypothesis 1 on necessary conditions in 
Figure  2, see also Table A1, appendix. To assess our 
hypotheses on sufficient conditions (hypotheses 2 and 
3), we apply Ragin’s (1987) principles of formal set-the-
oretic theory evaluation, as extended by Schneider and 
Wagemann (2012) to account for consistency and cov-
erage. This procedure identifies the proportion of cases 
that confirm, refute, or extend our theoretical expecta-
tions. To this end, the scenarios expected (T) and those 
not expected (~T) in the hypotheses were intersected 
with the scenarios that were empirically (not) observed 
(S and ~S). This technique helps us answer three ques-
tions. First, which parts of the theory are supported by 
the findings (T*S and ~T*~S)? Second, in which direc-
tion should theory be expanded (~T*S)? Third, which 
parts of the theory need to be dropped (T*~S)? Table 2 
summarizes the main analytic steps.
The data, truth tables, directional expectations, 
conservative and parsimonious solutions, simplifying 
assumptions, skewness tests, R codes for replication, 
and the results not reported in the paper are all pro-
vided as online Supplementary Material.2
Data
We used two data samples collected in the Netherlands 
in two sectors (healthcare and education) at two times 
2 The online appendix and replication materials are published at data 
verse, see http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/G9PYIV.
3 No analysis of sufficiency was possible for dataset 2 using the recoding 
method, see Supplementary Tables B13 and B20.
Box 1.  Procedure for Model Evaluation and 
Selection, Analysis of Sufficiency
Setting raw consistency thresholds is decisive for 
determining which conditions are sufficient. Since 
consistency values strongly depend on the specific 
dataset, truth table, and case distributions, there 
are no fixed anchors for setting these thresholds 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Thomann and 
Maggetti 2017). Accordingly, using standard-
ized thresholds is widely considered bad prac-
tice (Wagemann et al. 2016). Therefore, we use a 
context-sensitive strategy that integrates PRI val-
ues for determining raw consistency thresholds. 
Considering the range of PRI values in a truth table, 
a context-specific critical PRI value was determined. 
This procedure ensures that raw consistency is set 
such that simultaneous subset relations—when the 
same configuration is considered sufficient for both 
low and high implementation willingness—are 
avoided (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). The first 
raw consistency threshold was set above the first 
row with a PRI below this critical value; the second 
threshold was set above the second row with a PRI 
below that value; and the third threshold, above 
the third respective row. Hence, the same principle 
was applied to each analysis, but considering the 
specificities of the respective truth table.
Supplementary Tables B2–B7 report all resulting 
models and illustrate their robustness. The “best” 
models for each dataset, calibration strategy and 
outcome (high and low implementation willingness) 
were then identified according to their performance 
regarding consistency, PRI, coverage, statistical 
significance, limited diversity, ambiguity, robust-
ness, and skewness. These criteria comprehensively 
capture the main currently discussed challenges to 
validity with set-theoretic techniques (Thomann 
and Maggetti 2017; Table 1). The best model is the 
one whose average rank on each of these indica-
tors is the highest amongst those models with a 
minimum consistency of 0.75. Below this threshold, 
QCA solutions are usually not considered sufficient 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012). The ranking 
procedure is self-explanatory for consistency, PRI, 
coverage, Z values, and robustness. Additionally, 
high levels of limited diversity and model ambigu-
ity were punished, by rewarding the lowest levels 
a ranking of 1; the highest level is attributed the 
lowest possible rank (eg, 7 if seven models pass 
the consistency threshold); then the second highest 
level is attributed the second worst rank, and so on. 
The motivation for this was that limited diversity 
poses serious threats to inferences with truth table 
analyses (Thomann and Maggetti 2017) and model 
ambiguities indicate that the results are inconclu-
sive (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017).
This left us with six sufficient models, among 
which the ones with the highest explanatory 
power (coverage) were preferred for each out-
come and dataset, reported in Table 4 and chosen 
for interpretation.3 This procedure minimizes the 
weakness of many large-N set-theoretic configu-
rational comparative  analyses, which often suf-
fer from very limited coverage (Wagemann et al. 
2016).
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(2010 and 2013). By analyzing these two datasets, we 
both evaluate whether our hypotheses hold for front-
line workers implementing a specific policy (dataset 
1), and whether the hypothesized relations hold in 
another policy sector and from a more general perspec-
tive (dataset 2). This allows us to adopt a comparative 
approach and provides a stronger empirical basis to 
either accept or reject the hypotheses. Still, in examin-
ing two case studies, the possibility to make general 
claims remains limited. This is acknowledged and will 
be discussed in the discussion section.
Dataset 1
The 2010 study (“study 1”) investigated whether 
Dutch mental healthcare workers felt alienated from 
one specific government policy program, namely, the 
Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) policy, and their will-
ingness to implement this new policy. The DRG policy 
was developed by the Dutch government as a means 
to determine the level of financial reward for mental 
healthcare provision by stipulating a standard rate for 
each disorder. The sampling frame consisted of 5,199 
professionals who were members of two nationwide 
mental healthcare associations (see Tummers et  al. 
2012). Using an e-mail and two reminders, 1,317 
returns of the questionnaire were received (25% 
response). The gender composition of the respondents 
was 66% female. This is consistent with the Dutch 
average (69%) for mental healthcare professionals. 
The average age was slightly higher than that of the 
mental healthcare professional population (48 versus 
44). Common reasons for not participating were a lack 
of time, retirement, change of occupation, or not work-
ing with the DRG policy.
Dataset 2
The 2013 study (“study 2”) investigated whether Dutch 
teachers felt alienated from government education poli-
cies in general, and the relationship with their general 
willingness to implement government policies. The sam-
pling frame consisted of a nation-wide sample of 2,863 
teachers working in secondary education, selected 
through the pension fund for all Dutch employees in 
government and education (ABP) (Van Engen et  al. 
2016). Using an e-mail and one reminder, 1,096 returns 
of the questionnaire were received (38% response). 
On average, the respondents were 51  years old, and 
59% were male. Dutch national statistics on secondary 
school teachers in 2013 have shown that the average 
age is 46, and 48% are male. In our sample, males were, 
therefore, somewhat overrepresented, and the respond-
ents were on average slightly older than the national 
average. To rule out a nonresponse bias, we asked the 
organization managing the sampling frame to analyze 
whether or not the respondents problematically differed 
from nonrespondents in terms of variables such as age, 
gender, and occupation. For instance, the results indi-
cated there were no significant differences between the 
two groups in terms of occupation (respondents with 
managing responsibilities: 8%; nonrespondents: 9%). 
They also indicated that the arguments nonrespond-
ents gave for not participating usually were “no time”, 
“forgot the questionnaire”, and “did not open e-mail 
during response period”. Nevertheless, it is important 
to highlight that although we argue that our data is 
fairly representative, it is still possible that some type of 
response bias could have influenced our results.
Measures
The measures of implementation willingness, pow-
erfulness, and meaningfulness were formatted using 
five-point Likert scales. All measures had adequate 
Cronbach alphas (ranging between 0.78 and 0.97). 
Supplementary Table B1 shows all survey items and 
descriptive statistics for all variables.
In dataset 1, we measured policy powerfulness (stra-
tegic, tactical, and operational powerfulness: six indi-
cators) and policy meaningfulness (societal: twelve 
indicators, client: four indicators) for a specific policy 
using the policy alienation measurement scales of 
Tummers (2012). In dataset 2, we measured general 
policy powerfulness (strategic, tactical, and opera-
tional powerfulness: six indicators) and general policy 
Table 2. Main Steps of the Large-N Set-Theoretic Configurational Comparative Analysis
Step 1 Analysis of necessity (H1) Identify the supersets of high implementation willingness for both datasets, using 
two calibration strategies
Step 2 Analysis of sufficiency Identify subsets of low and high implementation willingness, using both datasets, 
two calibration strategies, three different raw consistency thresholds, and three 
different frequency thresholds
Step 3 Model evaluation, analysis of 
sufficiency
Identify best-performing model for each outcome, dataset and calibration strategy 
(criteria see Table 1)
Step 4 Model selection, sufficient 
conditions
Identify the models with highest explanatory power per dataset and outcome for 
interpretation
Step 5 Formal set-theoretic theory 
evaluation (H2 and H3)
Identify how results behave with respect to the hypotheses: which (parts of) the 
hypotheses are supported, which ones are refuted?
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meaningfulness (societal and client: four indicators) 
using the general policy alienation measurement scales 
of Van Engen et al. (2016). Implementation willingness 
was measured using five indicators corresponding to 
the validated scale by Metselaar (1997). If necessary, we 
inverted the positive and negative end of the respective 
scales, so that high scores always indicate high powerful-
ness, meaningfulness, and implementation willingness.
Calibration
Indicator variables were calibrated into indicator sets. 
Set-membership requires a statement about a qualita-
tive state: cases are either (more or less) in a set or 
(more or less) out of a set. The answer categories of 
Likert scales have a fixed qualitative meaning, which 
can be directly translated into set-membership scores. 
For example, if a frontline worker answers “disagree” 
(score of 2 on 1–5 scale) to the question “In my organi-
zation, professionals could take part in conversations 
regarding the execution of the policy”, then this means 
that on this item the case “tactical powerfulness” is 
rather absent, but not totally absent.
The neutral answer (score of 3) poses a conceptual 
challenge for calibrating set-membership (Wagemann 
et al. 2016). In Box 2, we discuss in detail the nature of 
this challenge and how we address it.
In short, we conceive of indifferent values as more 
out than in of the set. To identify the best calibration 
strategy, we tested for two different commonly used 
calibration techniques for Likert scales. First, the direct 
method of calibration uses a logistic function to fit the 
raw data in-between the three qualitative set-mem-
bership anchors (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 
35). Using our data, this commonly applied technique 
results in set-membership scores of 0.05, 0.27, 0.73, 
and 0.95; indifferent answers were coded as “fully 
out”. Second, we alternatively treated the answers as 
a scale using a simple recoding technique. This tech-
nique involves the grouping of cases into previously 
defined set-membership scores (Emmenegger et  al. 
2014; Schneider and Wagemann 2012), see Table 3 for 
an example. Based on assessment of their performance 
(see Supplementary Boxes B1 and B2), we adopted the 
recoding method for dataset 1 and the direct calibra-
tion method for dataset 2 for the results interpreted 
below (see Supplementary Tables B2–B7). Both strate-
gies attribute the same values on the Likert scale as 
more in / more out of the set, resulting in the same 
conceptual meaning, but different parameters of fit.
Missing values make it impossible to attribute 
cases to truth table configurations. This is a potential 
issue since a high share of cases has missing values on 
at least one indicator set in dataset 1. This is due to 
the fact that we gave the possibility to indicate “don’t 
know” for each item in dataset 1 and doing this on 
one out 39 items already indicates a missing value 
(60% in dataset 1, 7.8% in dataset 2). Excluding 
these cases from the analysis would result in a biased 
sample.
The aggregation strategy will affect the analysis. It 
needs to avoid such excessive dropout, whereas ensur-
ing construct validity and avoiding overly skewed 
condition and outcome sets. The first out of three 
aggregation options would be building averages across 
the indicators. Doing so for raw values would nega-
tively affect construct validity: the inclusion of neu-
tral answers (score 3) leads to average values that are 
difficult to interpret especially since they are numer-
ous. Calculating averages of calibrated sets is equally 
Box 2.  Procedure to Test for Different 
Calibration Strategies
The neutral answer (score of 3) poses a concep-
tual challenge for calibrating set membership. 
Neutral answers could indicate that a frontline 
worker experiences neither the presence nor the 
absence of, say, tactical powerfulness (point of 
indifference). However, cases with a set mem-
bership score of 0.5 cannot be attributed to 
truth table rows, which results in excessive 
dropout rates and should therefore be avoided 
(Wagemann et al. 2016). Although Likert scales 
are typically acknowledged to represent ordi-
nal rather than interval-level data (Wirth and 
Edwards 2007), the status of neutral answers in 
the scale and hence also in the set can be dis-
puted. One possible interpretation is that the 
answer “neither agree nor disagree” indicates 
less agreement than “rather agree”, but more 
agreement than “rather disagree”—we can treat 
the answers as scale. However, another possible 
interpretation is that “neither agree nor disa-
gree” indicates both “no agreement” as well as 
“no disagreement”—in other words, no pres-
ence, of, say, powerfulness at all. Hence, these 
cases would in fact be “fully out” of the set of, 
for example, tactical powerfulness.
Different calibration techniques can substan-
tially affect the results of set-theoretic configura-
tional comparative analyses (Skaaning 2011). To 
identify the best calibration strategy, we tested for 
two different commonly used calibration tech-
niques for Likert scales. First, the direct method 
of calibration uses a logistic function to fit the raw 
data in-between the three qualitative set member-
ship anchors (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 
35). This method is very popular in large-N set-
theoretic configurational comparative  analyses. 
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problematic because it can result in set-memberships 
of 0.5, producing dropouts during truth table analysis. 
The second and third options are set-theoretic. Using 
the logical AND as aggregation strategy (minimum 
rule) represents a very restrictive conceptualization, 
as all indicators need to be present simultaneously for 
an attitude to be present. This results in the excessive 
dropouts. Moreover, it would produce highly skewed 
sets that make it impossible to proceed with the analy-
sis of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 
244–251). For example, in dataset 1, none of the 
aggregated sets would have more than 5% cases with 
membership above 0.5.
Accordingly, as the third and in our view superior 
option, we use the logical “OR” to aggregate the indi-
cators into the five condition sets. This aggregation 
strategy conceives of different indicators as functional 
equivalents that indicate the presence of an attitude 
(Goetz and Starr 2003). For instance, it suffices for 
a frontline worker to have a score on one of the five 
indicator sets for “Willingness” (“W”) to obtain a 
value for “W” (maximum rule). This “optimistic” 
measure lowers the dropout problem (final N for data-
set 1 = 1,004, dropout 23.8%; for dataset 2 = 1,087, 
dropout 0.8%) and produces acceptable levels of 
skewness that enable an analysis of the outcome. This 
has consequences in terms of concept validity: the pos-
itive memberships in sets represent a wider range of 
functionally equivalent attitudes, which are assumed 
to represent the concept. This conceptualization does 
justice to the wide range of experiences facing front-
line workers on the ground.
Results
We can now evaluate the hypotheses. Supplementary 
Table B1 displays descriptive statistics. They show 
that, overall, the Dutch teachers (study 2) have a more 
positive attitude than the healthcare workers (study 
1). They feel more powerful, perceive the policies as 
more meaningful, and have higher implementation 
willingness.
Regarding hypothesis 1, we indeed found that feel-
ings of powerfulness are almost always necessary for 
high implementation willingness. This holds for both 
datasets and regardless of the calibration strategy used 
(see Table A1, appendix). This is shown in Figure 2. 
In the Dutch education sector, either strategic, tactical, 
or operational powerfulness is needed for high imple-
mentation willingness. Among Dutch healthcare work-
ers, the finding is even stronger: it is enough for high 
implementation willingness to either feel powerful at 
the strategic or operational level, or alternatively, to 
feel powerful at the operational or tactical level. These 
results provide strong support for the hypothesis that 
powerfulness at different levels is a prerequisite for 
implementation willingness.
Hypothesis 2 captured a potential consequence of 
the first hypothesis, namely, that a lack of powerful-
ness might be quasi-sufficient for low implementation 
willingness. Table  4 reveals three configurations in 
dataset 1, and five configurations in dataset 2, that are 
almost always sufficient for low implementation will-
ingness. The Dutch health workers who are unwilling 
Typically, the crossover point is set right above the 
indifferent answers, resulting in set memberships 
extremely close to 0.5 that can hardly be inter-
preted in conceptual terms. As Wagemann et al. 
(2016: 5) point out: “This is arbitrary and should 
not become common practice. (…) [it] does not 
have much to do with a decision about set mem-
bership”. To avoid this pitfall, we interpret neu-
tral answers as “fully out” of the set (the cases 
remain in the sample, but they have a set member-
ship of 0). Answers of 4 (agree) and 5 (fully agree) 
were recoded into 3 and 4 before calibration (for 
thresholds see caption of Supplementary Table 
B1). Second, we alternatively treated the answers 
as a scale using simple recoding technique, which 
involves the grouping of cases into previously 
defined set-membership scores (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012: 35). Here, we followed the pro-
posal by Emmenegger et al. (2014: 8) (and slightly 
adapted it to account for degrees of nonmember-
ship) and used the calibration anchors shown 
schematically in Table 3.
Our results indicate that in the analysis of suf-
ficiency, the recoding method works better for 
dataset 1 (the models perform better and explain 
more cases), while for dataset 2, the direct strat-
egy is more feasible—recoding method leads to 
distorted parameters of fit that prevent a mean-
ingful analysis of sufficiency (see Supplementary 
Tables B13 and B20). Importantly, however, both 
calibration strategies attribute indifferent answers 
as more out than in the set, resulting in the same 
conceptual meaning and attribution of cases to 
truth table rows. The differences in the results are 
thus exclusively due to changes in the parameters 
of fit. The results of necessity are robust regard-
less of the calibration strategy. Using the direct 
strategy for dataset 1 for sufficient conditions 
leads to the same overall conclusions regarding 
our hypotheses as with the indirect strategy. For 
these reasons, we adopted the recoding method 
for dataset 1 and the direct calibration method 
for dataset 2 for the results interpreted below (see 
Supplementary Tables B3, B4, B6, and B7).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jpart/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jopart/muy024/5048691
by Universite and EPFL Lausanne user
on 06 July 2018
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2018, Vol. xx, No. xx12
to implement the DRG policy consistently experience 
low levels of powerfulness and, in path 3, meaningful-
ness. Conversely, in the education sector, the picture is 
less clear at first sight: these configurations entail a mix 
of both positive and negative attitudes. The parame-
ters of fit score well in dataset 1, whereas in dataset 2, 
the results are highly consistent, but have a fairly low 
empirical relevance (coverage).
Using set-theoretic theory evaluation to assess H2 
formally, we find robust support that the absence 
of tactical, strategic, and operational powerfulness 
implies low implementation willingness in the health-
care sector. This is shown in Table 5. However, quite 
some cases remain unexplained (lower right quadrant). 
In addition and compatible to what we hypothesized, 
the absence of operational, but not also tactical and 
strategic powerfulness in some situations also leads to 
low implementation willingness (lower left quadrant). 
Conversely, in the education sector, overall the empiri-
cal support for the second hypothesis is so weak that 
we must reject it. The contradictory cases are empiri-
cally more frequent than those instances that directly 
support the hypothesis (left-hand side of Table  5). 
Here, the solution term only explains a tiny frac-
tion of the observed patterns of low implementation 
willingness.
Overall, the conclusion for H2 is ambiguous. 
Although powerfulness is a quasi-necessary condition 
for high willingness, the “flipside” of this argument 
materializes in the healthcare, but not in the educa-
tional sector. Although seemingly puzzling, this finding 
illustrates that the things that motivate people at the 
workplace can be different from those that demotivate 
them (see also Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 42–54, 
82–83).
The third hypothesis states that the combination 
of policy powerfulness (strategic, tactical, or opera-
tional) and policy meaningfulness (societal or client 
meaningfulness) is a quasi-sufficient condition for high 
implementation willingness. Table  4 indeed suggests 
that the combination of high powerfulness and mean-
ingfulness relate to high implementation willingness. 
Four configurations are very often sufficient for high 
Table 3. From Likert Scale to Indicator Sets: An 
Example of Recoding Method
Likert score
Survey question: “I intend to 
put effort into achieving the 
goals of the DRG policy”
Indicator fuzzy set score
Set: “High implementation 
willingness, indicator 2”
Completely agree (5) Highly willing (1)
Agree (4) Mostly but not highly 
willing (0.8)
Neutral (3) Rather unwilling (0.4)
Disagree (2) Mostly but not fully 
unwilling (0.2)
Completely disagree (1) Fully unwilling (0)
Figure 2. Evaluation of Hypothesis 1.
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implementation willingness in the Dutch healthcare 
sector, and three are almost always sufficient config-
urations in the education sector. For example, Dutch 
healthcare workers who feel powerful at the strategic 
and tactical level and to whom the DRG policy makes 
sense for the patients typically make efforts to imple-
ment the policy. Both models have a good consistency, 
whereas its explanatory power (coverage) is quite low 
in the education sector. The left-hand side and lower 
right quadrant of Table 6 lend full support to our third 
hypothesis. Powerfulness, in one of its three variants, 
combined with meaningfulness almost always results 
in high implementation willingness. This support is 
empirically stronger in study 2 (education) than in 
study 1 (healthcare).
However, findings also restrict the hypothesis to cer-
tain circumstances. For example, the upper left quad-
rant of Table  6 shows that in the healthcare sector, 
the positive motivational role of tactical powerfulness 
together with meaningfulness often unfolds even in the 
absence of either strategic or operational powerful-
ness. In the education sector, regardless of the type of 
powerfulness typically both societal and client mean-
ingfulness must be present. Conversely, the instances in 
which hypothesis 3 is rejected both datasets are negli-
gibly rare (upper right quadrant).
In summary, both bottom-up interpretations (H1 
and H3) of how perceived discretion motivates front-
line workers are indeed reflected in our data. H2 is 
supported for the first dataset but rejected for the 
second. However, for the second interpretation, there 
is also room for improvement, as quite some cases 
are not explained (23.4% in dataset 1 and 41.7% in 
dataset 2 point to overlooked explanations). This is 
not particularly high, as we aimed to explain willing-
ness with just a few indicators and the unexplained 
Table 5. Evaluation of Hypothesis 2
Empirics
Detected in solution Not detected in solution
Theory Hypothesized ~SP*~TP*~OP + SP*~TP*~OP  
*~SM*~CM
~SP*~TP*~OP *~SM*CM +  
~SP*~TP*~OP*CM
14.1 % / 0.1 % (~W): support theory
4.8 % / 0.6 % (W): contradict  
theory & solution
Empty set
~SP*~TP*~OP *~CM +  
SP*~TP*~OP *~SM*~CM
0 % / 4.5% (~W): support theory
0 % / 6.6 % (W): delimit theory
Not hypothesized ~OP*(SP*~TP + SP*~SM*~CM +  
~SP*TP + TP*~SM*~CM)
~SP*OP*~SM*CM +  
~SP*~TP*OP*SM*~CM + 
SP*~OP*~SM*CM + 
SP*~TP*~OP*SM*~CM + 
TP*~OP*~SM*CM +  
~SP*TP*~SM*CM
14 % / 1.4 % (~W): extend theory
8 % / 2.9 % (W): empirical  
contradictions
OP + SP*TP*OP*CM +  
SP*TP*OP*SM + SP*OP +  
SP*TP*CM + SP*TP*SM + TP*OP
OP*~SM*~CM + TP*OP*~CM +  
OP*SM*CM + SP*OP +  
SP*OP*SM*CM + TP*OP*SM + 
SP*~SM*~CM + SP*TP*~CM +  
SP*SM*CM + SP*TP*SM + 
~SP*TP*~OP*~CM +  
TP*~SM*~CM + TP*~CM +  
TP*OP*SM*CM + SP*TP*OP + 
SP*TP*SM*CM + TP*SM
28.5 % / 21.6 % (~W): point to  
overlooked explanations
30.6 % / 62.3 % (W): support theory
Supports theory Extends theory Delimits theory
Based on Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 301).
Bold: hypothesized combinations. No italics: dataset 1 (recoding method), italics: dataset 2 (direct calibration).
Hypothesis 2: ~SP*~TP*~OP → ~W.
This table shows how the results behave with respect to hypothesis 2. The upper left quadrant shows those attitudes that were both hypoth-
esized and observed with a set-membership > 0.5. The lower left quadrant displays those attitudes that were not expected, but observed empir-
ically, revealing additional explanations for low implementation willingness. The upper right quadrant refers to attitudes that were expected 
but not observed in the solution. The lower right quadrant displays those attitudes that are neither hypothesized nor covered by the solution.
We indicate the percentage of all cases that display these attitudes with different levels of implementation willingness, and what that means 
for interpreting the results. For example, in the upper left quadrant, those frontline workers that display these attitudes and have low imple-
mentation willingness support the hypothesis; those that have high implementation willingness are “contradictions”, that is, they separate the 
quasi-sufficient results from perfect sufficiency.
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variance is quite low. In field studies in social sciences, 
we should not expect a perfect theory explaining 
everything. It suggests that powerfulness combined 
with meaningfulness is only one of several factors 
that explain frontline workers’ high implementation 
willingness.
Discussion
The main conclusion of our study is that discretion-as-
perceived is a quasi-necessary condition for high imple-
mentation willingness. This aligns with Herzberg’s 
motivation theory and suggests an enabling (but not 
automatically triggering) motivational effect of per-
ceived discretion (Goertz and Starr 2003; Herzberg 
et al. 1959). Frontline workers need to feel that they 
can influence the policy—this is a necessary condition.
Secondly, we have found mixed evidence for the 
hypothesized more radical “flipside” of the first inter-
pretation. This result resonates with a classic insight 
from Herzberg’s motivation theory: the things that 
make people feel satisfied and motivated on the job can 
be different in kind from the things that make them 
feel dissatisfied—and this can obviously vary between 
policy sectors and types of professions (Bassett-Jones 
et al. 2005; Herzberg et al. 1959; Sachau 2007).
Table 6. Evaluation of Hypothesis 3
Empirics
Detected in solution Not detected in solution
Theory Hypothesized SP*SM*(TP*CM + TP*~OP) +  
SP*CM*(OP + TP + 
TP*~OP*SM) + TP*CM* 
(OP*SM + OP) + OP*SM*(CM + 
SP*TP*CM + ~SP*TP) +  
OP*CM + OP*CM*(SP*TP +  
~SP*TP*SM + SP* SM)
OP*SM*CM + SP*OP*SM*CM + 
TP*OP*SM*CM + SP*SM*CM + 
SP*TP*SM*CM + TP*SM*CM
9.7 % / 15.7 % (W): support theory
4.4 %/ 1.2 % (~W): contradict  
theory & solution
SP*SM*(OP*~CM + + ~TP*~CM +  
~TP*~OP + TP*OP*~CM) + 
SP*~TP*~OP*CM +  
~TP*OP*SM*~CM +  
~SP*TP*~OP*SM +  
~SP*TP*~OP*CM
OP*SM*~CM + OP*~SM*CM +  
SP*SM*~CM + SP*~SM*CM +  
TP*SM*~CM + TP*~SM*CM
10.3% / 15 % (W): support theory
6.3 % / 4.3 % (~W): delimit theory
Not hypothesized Empty set
Empty set
~SP*~TP*~OP*~CM +  
~SP*~TP*~OP +  
~SP*~TP*~OP*~SM + ~SM*~CM 
+ ~SP*~OP*~SM*~CM +  
~TP*~OP*~SM*~CM
~SP*~TP*~OP*~CM +  
~SP*~TP*~OP +  
~SP*~TP*~OP*~SM + ~SM*~CM 
+ ~SP*~TP*~OP*~SM*~CM
23.4 % / 41.7 % (W): point to  
overlooked explanations
46 % / 22.1 % (~W): support theory
Supports theory Extends theory Delimits theory
Based on Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 301).
Bold: hypothesized combinations. No italics: dataset 1 (recoding method), italics: dataset 2 (direct calibration).
Hypothesis 3: OP*SM + OP*CM + SP*SM + SP*CM + TP*SM + TP*CM → W.
This table shows how the results behave with respect to hypothesis 3. The upper left quadrant shows those attitudes that were both hypoth-
esized and observed with a set-membership > 0.5. The lower left quadrant displays those attitudes that were not expected, but observed empir-
ically. The upper right quadrant refers to attitudes that were expected but not observed in the solution. The lower right quadrant displays those 
attitudes that are neither hypothesized nor covered by the solution.
We indicate the percentage of all cases that display these attitudes with different levels of implementation willingness, and what that means 
for interpreting the results. For example, in the upper left quadrant, those frontline workers that display these attitudes and have high imple-
mentation willingness support the hypothesis; those that have low implementation willingness are “contradictions”, that is, they separate the 
quasi-sufficient results from perfect sufficiency.
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Thirdly, we also found that—in combination with 
policy meaningfulness—powerfulness is quasi-suf-
ficient for high implementation willingness. When 
frontline workers felt that they had both high pow-
erfulness and that the policy was meaningful for soci-
ety, this strengthened their willingness to implement it 
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2012; Van der Voet 
et al., 2017).
Our results encourage scholars to rethink assump-
tions of implementation theory by moving from a cor-
relational logic to the consideration of asymmetric 
patterns. By adapting Herzberg et al.’s (1959) seminal, 
fundamentally asymmetric two-factor theory of moti-
vation to the context of frontline implementation, we 
are able to refine policy implementation theory. The 
important role of powerfulness could be uncovered 
by modeling asymmetric effects via a methodology 
specifically designed to test these (Ragin 1987, 2000; 
Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Our analysis sheds 
more light on the puzzling results of previous stud-
ies, which assumed symmetric, correlational patterns 
(Tummers 2011; Van Engen et al. 2016). The strong 
and robust asymmetric effect of powerfulness that we 
detected simply escaped the attention of these stud-
ies because their designs are unable to detect such 
asymmetric relationships (Schneider and Wagemann 
2012). This has helped us to identify discretion-as-
perceived as a necessary prerequisite for high imple-
mentation willingness. Accordingly, implementation 
theory might fruitfully turn toward more asymmetric 
and complexity-oriented models of policy in practice 
(Misangyi et  al. 2017; Raab et  al. 2015; Thomann 
et al. 2018).
A number of caveats apply for this study. First, 
apart from powerfulness and meaningfulness, addi-
tional factors such as caseloads, interactions, and 
resources influence frontline workers’ implementa-
tion willingness (e.g., May and Winter 2009; O’Toole 
2000; Sabatier 1986). Second, although we analyzed 
two large-N datasets, we should be careful to gen-
eralize these findings to frontline workers in other 
policy domains or countries. Third, whereas applying 
an “optimistic” measure of our dependent and inde-
pendent variables helped us reducing dropout and 
countering the skewness of the data, future research 
should study whether our results also hold applying 
“pessimistic” measures, ideally using large datasets in 
multiple sectors and countries where cases with miss-
ing values can be completely deleted from the dataset. 
Fourth, although there is a fairly strong correlation 
between intended behavior and actual behavior 
(Armitage and Connor 2001; Randall and Wolf 1994; 
Sheeran and Orbell 1988), future studies could meas-
ure behavior more directly. Fifth, it should be noted 
that common method bias could be a problem in our 
study, since we used the same data source to measure 
the variables under study (powerfulness, meaningful-
ness, implementation willingness). It is recommended 
that future researchers studying the relationship 
between powerfulness and implementation willing-
ness apply stronger designs and techniques to estab-
lish causal inference. We recommend the use of field, 
lab, or survey experiments.
Conclusion
Despite the fundamental theoretical debate on the 
role of discretion and its relevance for policy design 
and implementation, to date, there has been little 
empirical research to assess the behavioral assump-
tions underlying this debate. Our study is the first 
large-N empirical illustration lending robust support 
to a bottom-up view on discretion as an inevitable 
and potentially beneficial aspect of frontline imple-
mentation. We find that possibilities to participate 
in and influence public policies are a prerequisite 
for frontline workers to be willing to implement the 
policy. However, this is not enough. It is not suffi-
cient. Other factors—including perceiving the policy 
as meaningful for society and clients—are needed to 
truly increase the willingness to implement of front-
line workers.
Our study contributes to clarifying the behavio-
ral underpinnings of the top-down versus bottom-
up debate on discretion (Hupe 2013; Sabatier 1986; 
Thomann et al. 2016). The question whether frontline 
workers should be granted discretion continues to be 
hotly debated not only in research on policy imple-
mentation, but also on policy, regulatory, and organi-
zational design (e.g., Chun and Rainey 2005; Howlett 
2004). Our findings lend substantial support to a bot-
tom-up view of street-level bureaucrats as problem-
solvers who crucially need the freedom to adapt the 
program to local conditions. Conversely, they lend very 
little support to top-down assertions that high levels 
of discretion often or predominantly have a negative 
impact on policy implementation—at least not at the 
perceived, motivational level.
The link between implementation willingness and 
actual implementation behavior—which was not ana-
lyzed here—will continue to provide fertile grounds for 
further exploration (see e.g., Brodkin 1997; Chun and 
Rainey 2005; Gofen 2013). Committed implementers 
are a crucial factor for successful policy implementa-
tion (May and Winter 2009). Our contribution lies 
in showing that the overwhelming majority of those 
frontline workers with high implementation willing-
ness also experience high levels of discretion. This 
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should encourage scholars and practitioners to move 
beyond the question whether frontline workers should 
be granted discretion: our answer to this question 
is yes.
The more salient question seems to be how to 
make best use of frontline workers’ discretion to 
encourage behavior that eventually contributes to 
the achievement of policy goals. Discretion appears 
as a defining contextual feature of street-level bur-
eaucratic work that changes the daily experiences 
shared by frontline workers. This emphasizes the 
importance of future research that singles out how 
a context of more or less discretion affects frontline 
workers’ actual behavior, and under which specific 
circumstances.
Finally, systematic comparative empirical assess-
ment of street-level bureaucracy theory like ours 
demonstrate the potential of large-N comparisons 
over different policy contexts to facilitate theoretical 
progress in this field (O’Toole 2000). A  micro-level 
perspective is useful to evaluate the underlying psy-
chology and mechanisms of frontline implementation 
(Grimmelikhuijsen et  al. 2017). It provides valuable 
information to policymakers and managers engaged in 
shaping the macro- and meso-level contexts of street-
level bureaucracy, in their continuous quest to improve 
public service delivery.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplementary material is available at the Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory online 
(https://academic.oup.com/jpart/).
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